The question

Many housing transaction taxes are notches: once the price crosses a threshold, the higher rate applies to the whole price. New York's 2019 budget created seven buyer-paid notches on one date, from $2 million to $25 million, and left the $1 million mansion tax unchanged. What does a schedule of notches do to sales, and what does that mean for the shape of a housing tax?

The paper compares prices at the same thresholds before and after the reform, with the $1 million threshold as a control. It then applies the result to New York City's mortgage recording tax, whose standard borrower schedule is 1.80–1.925% of recorded mortgage principal for the covered residential categories. The calculations are before credits, exemptions and consolidation adjustments.

Main findings

  • 7.8 → 1.6sales at exactly $2 million relative to local density, before and after it became a taxed threshold
  • 2–3×the tax jump: the range of prices emptied above the $2 million and $3 million thresholds after the reform
  • $2–3Ma year of avoided tax at the new notches, if the extra sales below each threshold came from above it: 2–3% of the revenue the reform's schedule implies between $2 million and $6 million
  • 1.41%of price for houses and 1.28% for condominiums: the gross recording charge the schedule implies on 172,725 observed loans, before credits and exemptions
  • $244Ma year: a fixed-sample benchmark: the gross charge the schedule implies on four-borough residential purchase money, transactions held fixed, before credits, exemptions and consolidation adjustments; 98% of it measured on actual loans

Each new threshold's response is larger than the same measure at any of sixteen never-taxed round prices, and a year-by-year check shows it starting with the reform. The tax figures are gross schedule-implied charges and fixed-transaction costings. They do not identify who ultimately bears the tax, how sales would respond to a continuous tax, or an optimal rate.

Sales at exactly the round price, relative to local density, before and after the 2019 reform $1M 0.1 to 0.1; $2M 7.8 to 1.6; $3M 7.0 to 1.5; $1.5M 5.2 to 6.2; $2.5M 7.8 to 10.6. Before April 2019 From January 2020 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Sales at exactly the price ÷ local density $1M (taxed since 1989): 0.1 before, 0.1 after $1M taxed since 1989 $2M (newly taxed July 2019): 7.8 before, 1.6 after $2M newly taxed July 2019 $3M (newly taxed July 2019): 7.0 before, 1.5 after $3M newly taxed July 2019 $1.5M (never taxed): 5.2 before, 6.2 after $1.5M never taxed $2.5M (never taxed): 7.8 before, 10.6 after $2.5M never taxed
The exact-price spike shrinks at the new tax boundaries while remaining at nearby comparison prices. Before: January 2016–March 2019; after: January 2020–December 2025, excluding the transition period. Values are exact-price counts divided by local price density, not a fitted counterfactual. The table gives the values.
Show as a table
PriceStatusBeforeAfter
$1Mtaxed since 19890.10.1
$2Mnewly taxed July 20197.81.6
$3Mnewly taxed July 20197.01.5
$1.5Mnever taxed5.26.2
$2.5Mnever taxed7.810.6

Why it matters

  • Even a quarter-point notch relocates transactions, and responses did not rise in proportion to the rate, so the shape of a schedule matters as well as its level.
  • Debates over taxing cash purchases rarely start from the fact that the code already charges the financed buyer. That statutory difference can be measured directly from loans, without relying on a contested price gap.
  • A fixed-transaction costing gives legislators the order of magnitude of a purchase-money carve-out and of continuous schedules that match it within the sample.
Tax policymakersPublic-finance economistsHousing-policy analysts

What the results can tell us

The threshold comparisons describe transaction shifting around the reform. The mortgage-tax figures apply the statutory schedule to observed loans before credits, exemptions and consolidation adjustments. Replacement costings hold transactions fixed; they do not identify economic incidence, behavioural responses to a replacement or an optimal tax rate.

Cite this paper

BibTeX citation
@misc{loschi2026shape,
  author       = {Loschi, Pablo},
  title        = {The Shape of the Tax: Transaction Shifting at New York
                  City's 2019 Transfer-Tax Notches and the Mortgage
                  Recording Tax},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {Working paper, Zenodo},
  doi          = {10.5281/zenodo.22925301}
}